Imagine a man chatting with his AI girlfriend app. He looks at his smartphone and says, ‘Finally, I'm being understood’. Is he deceiving himself? Is there anything morally wrong with it? The human tendency to anthropomorphize AI is well established, and the popularity of AI companions is growing. This article answers three questions: (1) How can being charmed by AI's simulated emotions be considered self‐deception? (2) Why might we have an obligation to avoid harmless self‐deception? (3) When is self‐deception in (...) emotional relationships with AI morally questionable, and can it be blameworthy? Regarding question 1, I describe being seduced by AI's simulated emotions as self‐deception, where desires bias beliefs. In response to question 2, I outline two ways to justify a prima facie obligation to avoid harmless self‐deception – instrumental and autotelic. For question 3, I highlight crucial factors to consider in assessing the blameworthiness of harmless self‐deception, such as the emotional and cognitive competences of the self‐deceiver, reasons for self‐deception, and its consequences for one's predispositions, self‐image, and other people. Moreover, I argue that the ethical requirement to avoid self‐deception does not easily translate into attributing blame to others for being self‐deceived. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in (...) a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case. (shrink)

As well as disagreeing about how much one should donate to charity, moral theories also disagree about where one should donate. In light of this disagreement, how should the morally uncertain philanthropist allocate her donations? In many cases, one intuitively attractive option is for the philanthropist to split her donations across all of the charities that are recommended by moral views in which she has positive credence, with each charity’s share being proportional to her credence in the moral theories that (...) recommend that particular charity. Despite the fact that something like this approach is already being used by real-world philanthropists to distribute billions of dollars of donations, it is not supported by any of the approaches to moral uncertainty that have been proposed thus-far in the philosophical literature. In this paper, we will develop a bargaining-based approach to moral uncertainty that honors the proportionality intuition in favor of splitting one’s donations. We also show how this bargaining-based approach has several further advantages over the best alternative proposals. (shrink)

Moral latitude is only ever a matter of coincidence on the most popular decision procedure in the literature on moral uncertainty. In all possible choice situations other than those in which two or more options happen to be tied for maximal expected choiceworthiness, Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness implies that only one possible option is uniquely appropriate. A better theory of appropriateness would be more sensitive to the decision maker’s credence in theories that endorse agent-centred prerogatives. In this paper, we will develop (...) and defend a modified version of this view that allows for agent-centred prerogatives and supererogation as part of its verdicts about appropriateness. (shrink)

Tocząca się od kilkunastu lat wśród filozofów dyskusja na temat pojęcia informacji w biologii pozwala rzucić nowe światło na dotychczasowe porażki zastosowania teorii darwinowskiej do kultury. Ujawnia także daleko idące homologie między światem biologicznym a społecznokulturowym, co pozwala skorygować program darwinizmu socjologicznego w istotnych punktach.

Fanatics judge a lottery with a tiny probability of arbitrarily high value as better than the certainty of some modest value, and they are prone to getting swindled. You need only make the lie “big enough” to get one over on them. I put forward an elegant solution to the fanatic’s problem. When coming to a fully rational decision, agents may ignore outlandish possibilities.

Pojęcie sądu w sensie logicznym nie jest jednoznacznie scharakteryzowane w literaturze logicznej. Jednakże we wszystkich ważnych definicjach wskazuje się na znaczenie, sens lub konotację zdań oznajmujących. W artykule autor podaje różne definicje i charakterystyki wypracowane m. in. przez Fregego, Churcha, Ajdukiewicza i Vandervekena oraz wskazuje na główne czynniki, które należy poddać analizie przy opracowywaniu definicji sądu. Wychodząc od pojęcia sądu jako tego, co wspólne w różnych sądach w sensie psychologicznym autor formułuje własną definicję sądu w sensie logicznym tak, aby uwzględnione (...) były: 1) struktura sądu; 2) sens zdań oznajmujących; 3) możliwy świat, w którym dane zdanie jest wypowiedziane. (shrink)

Semiotics, the age-old investigation of signs, is still striving for acknowledgement as a scientific discipline. Though the ‘linguistic turn’ in the philosophical disciplines seemed to be followed by a ‘semiotic turn’ in many sciences during the 1970s, efforts were not crowned by great success. When seen from a certain distance, a definition of semiotics as a discipline can only be obtained from its history. Research into the sources of the human pre-occupation with signs, and with concepts or conceptions of signs, (...) is really desirable and even necessary when a field of considerable scientific interest at the brink of being awarded the rank of a discipline runs the risk of getting lost between the unificationism of the Morris-type and the elegance of pseudo-mathematical empty classificationism on the one side, and profitable exploitation of the sign's popularized design qualities on the other. (shrink)

The paper presents a mode of researching epistemological and conceptual implications of text focused on the category of countertextuality. Parallel to the development of the orality / literacy theory within different areas of humanities and social sciences there runs a thread of various reconceptualization of text and textuality. It implies an increasing awareness of the non-neutral character of text (as a means of communicating knowledge within the academia) for the research results, which appears on both methodological and ethical grounds.In the (...) paper the example of the project of postmodern anthropology is invoked to show how the constraints of the norms of writing texts specific of anthropology in mid-1980’s are articulated and what the proposed ways of writing are that would overcome the perceived flaws of text. The article focuses on the major manifesto of the postmodern turn in anthropology (Writng Culture), some other methodological articles of its authors, as well as some of the actual ethnographic researches. I highlight some of the major charges laid against text in these works and some of the major countertextual writing strategies. (shrink)

In 1982, Wolniewicz proposed a formal ontology of situations based on the lattice of elementary situations (cf. [7, 8]). In [3], I constructed some types of formal structure Porphyrian Tree Structures (PTS), Concepts Structures (CS) and the Structures of Individuals (U) that formally represent ontologically fundamental categories: species and genera (PTS), concepts (CS) and individual beings (U) (cf. [3, 4]). From an ontological perspective, situations and concepts belong to different categories. But, unexpectedly, as I shall show, some variants of CS (...) and Wolniewicz’s lattice are similar. The main theorem states that a subset of a modified concepts structure (called CS+) based on CS fulfils the axioms of Wolniewicz’ lattice. Finally, I shall draw some philosophical conclusions and state some formal facts. (shrink)

In the paper we treat one of the most hotly debated and still current topics in ontology i.e. the problem of universals. By two formal representations of incomplete and complete objects we argue that only genera and species (as counterparts of Aristotle's Forms and Plato's Ideas) are universals. They only are what is called nature or essence of individuals named by general terms. On the contrary, although the concepts are second kind of objects signified by general terms, they have another (...) status as complete objects. Hence, in that meaning "generality" stick in two different kind of objects – in universals and concepts. But being general is not equal to being universal in Aristotle's and Plato's sense. (shrink)

The goal of this text is to elaborate the notion of pricelessness. The issue of pricelessness is distinguished from other important points in the Moral Limits of Markets debate. The proposition of the meaning of pricelessness is presented and discussed. I argue that the notion of pricelessness should not be identified with the notion of dignity or the highest value. The value which is a basis for the pricelessness claim does not have to be a moral value, the notion of (...) pricelessness functions at the crossroads between different kinds of values (moral, aesthetic, scientific, sentimental, commercial etc.). I argue that the core intuition associated with pricelessness refers to the incomparability of values. It is expressed as being price-less because money is seen as a universal comparator - it has a potential to translate any other values. Further, I distinguish three models of relation between commercial and priceless realms, named as: 1) contamination model, 2) contractual model, and 3) contextual model, in order to show that the attitudes toward the intuition that pricing itself may corrupt intrinsic values, depends on the presuppositions one shares. I argue that the conviction about corrupting force of money might be also explained by the intuitive concerns related to purity and degradation under Moral Foundations Theory. Using Radin's concepts, I claim that both non-commodities and incomplete commodities might be meaningfully called priceless. Finally, I recognize the limits of the argument from pricelessness and admit that it is rarely strong enough in itself to justify prohibition of commodification. (shrink)

According to the Asymmetry, creating a miserable person is wrong but failing to create a happy person is permissible, other things being equal. Some attempt to underwrite the Asymmetry by appealing to a choice-dependent moral theory according to which the deontic status of an act depends on whether it is chosen by the agent. We show that all choice-dependent moral theories in the literature are vulnerable to what we call the Parent Trap. These theories imply that the presence of impermissible (...) options can generate a moral requirement to create happy people, even at the cost of the procreator’s well-being. We consider two new choice-dependent theories that avoid this result, but show that they generate implausible moral permissions to create miserable people. Either way, choice-dependent theories fail to do justice to the intuitions that motivate the Asymmetry. (shrink)

One of Derek Parfit’s greatest legacies was the search for Theory X, a theory of population ethics that avoided all the implausible conclusions and paradoxes that have dogged the field since its inception: the Absurd Conclusion, the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Mere Addition Paradox. In recent years, it has been argued that this search is doomed to failure and no satisfactory population axiology is possible. This chapter reviews Parfit’s life’s work in the field and argues that he (...) provided all the necessary components necessary for a Theory X. It then shows how these components can be combined together and applied to the global challenges Parfit argued matter most: preventing human extinction, managing catastrophic risks, and eradicating global poverty and suffering. Finally, it identifies a number of challenges facing his theory and suggests how these may be overcome. (shrink)

This article examines the use of mathematical concepts in philosophy, focusing on topology, which may be viewed as a modern supplement to geometry. We show that Plato and Parmenides were already employing geometric ideas in their research, and discuss three examples of the application of topology to philosophical problems: the first concerns the analysis of the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, the second the ontology of possible worlds of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the third Leibniz's monadology. We also (...) consider the role of topology in mathematical explanations of the sort found in science, arguing that it can perform a role in philosophy that is of comparable importance. (shrink)

In recent papers, Elizabeth Finneron-Burns and Johann Frick have both argued that it is not a wrong-making feature of human extinction that it would cause many potential people with lives worth living never to be born, and hence that causing human extinction would be, in at least one way, less wrong than many have thought. In making these arguments, both assume that merely possible future people cannot be harmed by their nonexistence, and thus do not have any claim to be (...) brought into existence. In this paper, we raise objections to their arguments and suggest that there is nothing inherent in the moral theories they put forward that implies future people cannot have this sort of ‘existential’ claim. In doing so, we draw on the work of Derek Parfit, who argued, in a recent paper, that coming into existence benefits a person in that it is ‘good for’ them, even if it is not ‘better for’ them than non-existence. We also find that many of their objections to the view that it is wrong not to bring future people into existence rest on the assumption that, were these people to have claims on us, these must be equivalent to the claims that existing people have to be benefitted. However, we show that Parfit’s work demonstrates how this is not the case. (shrink)

Relationships between physicians and pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) often create conflicts of interest, not least because of the various benefits received by physicians. Many countries attempt to control pharmaceutical industry marketing strategies through legal regulation, and this is true in Poland where efforts are underway to eliminate any practices that might be considered corrupt in medicine. The present research considered Polish medical students’ opinions about domestic laws restricting doctors’ acceptance of expensive gifts from the industry, the idea of compulsory transparency, (...) and the possibility of introducing a Polish Sunshine Law. A qualitative, focus group-based, interview method was used. Data were gathered from nine focus groups involving 92 medical students from three universities located in major Polish cities. The article presents a classification of opposing student views with regard to the consequences of introducing different legal solutions; this should be useful for policy makers deliberating on how to optimally regulate pharmaceutical marketing. The study’s results are discussed in the context of the public bioethical debate in Poland. (shrink)

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, (...) from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

This article compares James M. Buchanan's and John Rawls's theories of democratic governance. In particular it compares their positions on the characteristics of a legitimate social contract. Where Buchanan argues that additional police force can be used to quell political demonstrations, Rawls argues for a social contract that meets the difference principle.

This book discusses how rational choice theory grew out of RAND's work for the US Air Force. It concentrates on the work of William J. Riker, Kenneth J. Arrow, James M. Buchanan, Russel Hardin, and John Rawls. It argues that within the context of the US Cold War with its intensive anti-communist and anti-collectivist sentiment, the foundations of capitalist democracy were grounded in the hyper individualist theory of non-cooperative games.

It is commonplace in discussions of modern cosmology to assert that the early universe began in a special state. Conventionally, cosmologists characterize this fine-tuning in terms of the horizon and flatness problems. I argue that the fine-tuning is real, but these problems aren't the best way to think about it: causal disconnection of separated regions isn't the real problem, and flatness isn't a problem at all. Fine-tuning is better understood in terms of a measure on the space of trajectories: given (...) reasonable conditions in the late universe, the fraction of cosmological histories that were smooth at early times is incredibly tiny. This discussion helps clarify what is required by a complete theory of cosmological initial conditions. (shrink)

Robots are now associated with various aspects of our lives. These sophisticated machines have been increasingly used in different manufacturing industries and services sectors for decades. During this time, they have been a factor in causing significant harm to humans, prompting questions of liability. Industrial robots are presently regarded as products for liability purposes. In contrast, some commentators have proposed that robots be granted legal personality, with an overarching aim of exonerating the respective creators and users of these artefacts from (...) liability. This article is concerned mainly with industrial robots that exercise some degree of self-control as programmed, though the creation of fully autonomous robots is still a long way off. The proponents of the robot’s personality compare these machines generally with corporations, and sporadically with, inter alia, animals, and idols, in substantiating their arguments. This article discusses the attributes of legal personhood and the justifications for the separate personality of corporations and idols. It then demonstrates the reasons for refusal of an animal’s personality. It concludes that robots are ineligible to be persons, based on the requirements of personhood. (shrink)

During the past few years considerable debate has arisen within academic journals with respect to the use of smart drugs or cognitive enhancement pharmaceuticals. The following paper seeks to examine the foundations of this cognitive enhancement debate using the example of methylphenidate use among college students. The argument taken is that much of the enhancement debate rests upon inflated assumptions about the ability of such drugs to enhance and over-estimations of either the size of the current market for such drugs (...) or the rise in popularity as drugs for enhancing cognitive abilities. This article provides an overview of the empirical evidence that methylphenidate has the ability to significantly improve cognitive abilities in healthy individuals, and examines whether the presumed uptake of the drug is either as socially significant as implied or growing to the extent that it requires urgent regulatory attention. In addition, it reviews the evidence of side-effects for the use of methylphenidate which may be an influential factor in whether an individual decides to use such drugs. The primary conclusions are that neither drug efficacy, nor the benefit-to-risk balance, nor indicators of current or growing demand provide sufficient evidence that methylphenidate is a suitable example of a cognitive enhancer with mass appeal. In light of these empirically based conclusions, the article discusses why methylphenidate might have become seen as a smart drug or cognitive enhancer. (shrink)

Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals' responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This (...) political theory is codified in non-cooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action. (shrink)

This volume offers the first-ever complete English translation of Leibniz’s Dissertatio De Arte Combinatoria together with a critical edition of the original Latin text on fa...

Deeply understood, democracy is more than a "formal" institutional framework for which America provides the model, acting as a preferable alternative to the modern totalitarian regimes that have distorted social life around the world. At its core, as John Dewey understood, democracy is a realistic ideal, a desired and desirable future possibility that is yet-to-be. In this period of global crises in differing cultures, a shared environment, and an increasingly globalized political economy, this book provides a clear contemporary articulation of (...) deep democracy that can guide an evolutionary deepening of democratic institutions, of habits of the heart, and of the processes of education and social inquiry that support them. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to assess the level of knowledge, attitude and practice of university teachers regarding plagiarism in Bangladesh. An online questionnaire consisted of 20 knowledge questions, 23 attitude items, and 18 practice questions was created using Google Forms. The link to the questionnaire was sent via email to university teachers. The total correct answers for knowledge and practice questions, and the total attitude score were converted to percentile scores and categorized accordingly as poor ( mean (...) + 1 SD). Bivariate analyses were conducted to compare the total knowledge, attitude and practice scores based on demographic and academic variables. Multiple linear regressions were used to identify the association between knowledge, attitude and practice scores, and other covariates. The findings revealed an average level of knowledge, attitude and practice regarding plagiarism among the majority of university teachers. The knowledge, attitude and practice scores were significantly higher for teachers who attended academic writing workshops compared to those who did not attend such events. Demographic and academic variables did not impact knowledge and attitude scores. However, the number of papers published in the last two years and their indexing in Web of Science (WoS) or Scopus significantly impacted attitude and knowledge scores. The multiple regression analyses showed that the practice score was significantly associated with age, highest education, and knowledge. (shrink)

While there are many points of opposition between the political philosophies of Marx and Kant, the two can greatly benefit from one another in various ways. Bringing the ideas of Marx and Kant together offers a promising way forward for each view. Most significantly, a powerful critique of capitalism can be developed from their combined thought: Kant’s political philosophy offers a robust idea of freedom to ground this critique, while Marx provides the nuanced understanding of social and political power structures (...) under capitalism that allows this idea of freedom to be properly applied. (shrink)

This paper explores how the Leviathan that projects power through nuclear arms exercises a unique nuclearized sovereignty. In the case of nuclear superpowers, this sovereignty extends to wielding the power to destroy human civilization as we know it across the globe. Nuclearized sovereignty depends on a hybrid form of power encompassing human decision-makers in a hierarchical chain of command, and all of the technical and computerized functions necessary to maintain command and control at every moment of the sovereign's existence: this (...) sovereign power cannot sleep. This article analyzes how the form of rationality that informs this hybrid exercise of power historically developed to be computable. By definition, computable rationality must be able to function without any intelligible grasp of the context or the comprehensive significance of decision-making outcomes. Thus, maintaining nuclearized sovereignty necessarily must be able to execute momentous life and death decisions without the type of sentience we usually associate with ethical individual and collective decisions. (shrink)

This article challenges the view of disability presented by Harris in his article, “Is gene therapy a form of eugenics?”1 It is argued that his definition of disability rests on an individual model of disability, where disability is regarded as a product of biological determinism or “personal tragedy” in the individual. Within disability theory this view is often called “the medical model” and it has been criticised for not being able to deal with the term “disability”, but only with impairment. (...) The individual model of disability presupposes a necessary causal link between a certain condition in the individual and disablement. The shortcomings of such a view of disability are stated and it is argued that in order to have an adequate ethical discourse on gene therapy perspectives from disability research need to be taken into consideration. (shrink)

Socialism has long been thought by many to be the enemy of freedom. Here, I argue that in order to understand the relationship between socialism and freedom, we must have a better idea both of what socialism is and of what it is to have a right to freedom. To start, I argue that the right to freedom is best understood as a right to direct one’s own will in the world consistently with the rights of others to do the (...) same. This Kantian conception of the right to freedom is importantly different from the ubiquitous conception of freedom as negative liberty: with this Kantian conception, one’s right to freedom is limited to directing one’s own will and does not include a right to direct the wills of others. I then argue that socialism, like the right to freedom, is often misunderstood: today, socialists often argue for robustly democratic forms of socialism that are far from the autocratic so-called “socialist” regimes of the last century. With a better understanding of both socialism and the right to freedom, we can see that the right to freedom is indeed compatible with a robustly democratic form of socialism. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse content from two recent reports to examine how a public health framework to cognitive enhancement is emerging. We find that, in several areas, these reports provide population-level arguments both for and against the use of cognitive enhancers. In discussing these arguments, we look at how these reports are indicative of potentially innovative frameworks—epidemiological, risk/benefit and socio-historical—by which to explore the public health impact of cognitive enhancement. Finally, we argue that these reports are suggestive of both (...) tensions between the bioethical and public health approaches and are also indicative of how these two frameworks can, in part, be seen as complementary. (shrink)

David Lewis presented Convention as an alternative to the conventionalism characteristic of early-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Rudolf Carnap is well known for suggesting the arbitrariness of any particular linguistic convention for engaging in scientific inquiry. Analytic truths are self-consistent, and are not checked against empirical facts to ascertain their veracity. In keeping with the logical positivists before him, Lewis concludes that linguistic communication is conventional. However, despite his firm allegiance to conventions underlying not just languages but also social customs, he pioneered (...) the view that convening need not require any active agreement to participate. Lewis proposed that conventions arise from “an exchange of manifestations of a propensity to conform to a regularity” (87–8). In reasserting the conventional quality of languages and other practices resting on mutual expectations, Lewis comfortably works within the analytic tradition. Yet he also deviates from his predecessors because his conventionalist approach is comprehensively grounded in instrumentalism. Lewis adopts an extension of David Hume's desire-belief psychology articulated in rational choice theory. He develops his philosophy of convention relying on the highly formal mid-twentieth-century expected utility and game theories. This attempt to account for language and social customs wholly in terms of instrumental rationality has the implication of reducing normativity to preference satisfaction. Lewis’ approach continues in the trend of undermining normative political philosophy because institutions and practices arise spontaneously, without the deliberate involvement of agents. Perhaps Lewis’ Convention is best seen as a resurgent form of analytic philosophy, characterized by “a style of argument, hostility to [ambitious] metaphysics, focus on language, and the dominance of logic and formalization” that solves the dilemma of “combining the analytic inheritance…with normative concerns” by reducing normativity to individuals’ preference fulfillment consistent with the axioms of rational choice. (shrink)

The author congratulates Dr Brian Hurwitz, who recently reported the successful “intimidation” of an elderly competent widow into accepting badly needed therapy for a huge ulcerated carcinoma. He reports approvingly of the Israeli Patients' Rights Law, enacted in 1996, which demands detailed informed consent from competent patients before permitting treatment. But the law also provides an escape clause which permits coercing a competent patient into accepting life-saving therapy if an ethics committee feels that if treatment is imposed the patient will (...) give his/her consent retroactively. He suggests this approach as an appropriate middle road between overbearing paternalism and untrammelled autonomy. (shrink)